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Notes and Comments
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-TAXATION-SCOPE OF REVIEW
ON APPEAL FROM TAX ASSESSMENT IN KENTUCKY
To what extent will the circuit court and the Court of Appeals
of Kentucky substitute their judgment for that of the State Tax
Commission when an appeal is prosecuted under Kentucky Re-
vised Statutes sections 183.1201 and 131.120? Prior to 1949
there was no problem in determining the scope of review by
the circuit courts under Kentucky Revised Statutes section
183.120. The statute, before amendment in 1949, provided
that any taxpayer aggrieved by the assessment of the county
board of supervisors could appeal either to the Tax Commission
or to the circuit court of the county in which the property was
located.2 The statute further provided that the court or Tax
Commission was to try the case de novo. The term de novo had
been defined by the Court of Appeals in the case of Greensburg
Deposit Bank v. Commonwealth,3 where it said that appeals
taken under this section should be tried de novo as provided in
'Ky. REv. STAT. see. 183.120 (4): ". . (4) Any taxpayer feeling himself
aggrieved by the final action of the board of supervisors may within fifteen days
after its adjournment appeal to the Kentucky Tax Commission by filing a statement
of the grounds for his appeal and a certified copy of the action of the board of
supervisors. The tax commissioner, the county judge, the Department of Revenue,
the chief finance officer of any city using the county assessment, if the city elects
to do so, or the superintendent of any school district in which property reviewed
by the board of supervisors is located, may appeal to the Tax Commission in the
same manner as a taxpayer. The party making the appeal shall give notice in the
manner provided by the Civil Code of Practice to all other parties entitled by
this section to appeal. The Tax Commission, sitting in the county in which the
property is located shall hear the evidence de novo and fix a value upon the
property consistent with sections 171, 172 and 174 of the Constitution. The
Commissioner of Revenue may appoint a conferee to conduct any hearings, re-
ceive evidence and hear argument, and embody same in a report to the Tax
Commission. Any of the parties may appeal from the judgment of the Tax Com-
mission to the circuit court of the county where the property is located and thence
to the Court of Appeals, as provided by law. No appeal under this section shall
delay the collection or payment of any taxes based upon the assessment in con-
troversy. The taxpayer shall pay all state, county and district taxes due on the
valuation which he claims as true value as and when required by law, and when
the valuation is finally determined upon appeal, the court or Tax Commission shall
certify the valuation to the county court clerk and the taxpayer shall be billed for
any additional tax and six percent interest from the date when the tax would
have become due if no appeal had been taken..
'Ky. RBv. STAT. see. 133.120 (1949).
3 230 Ky. 498, 29 S.W. 2d 949 (1929).
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Civil Code section 726. The Code provided that "Appeals shall
be docketed and stand for trial as ordinary actions, and shall be
tried anew, as if no judgment had been rendered."4 Thus the
scope of review by the circuit court, before amendment of the
statute in 1949, was plenary, with power to relitigate any item
and substitute judicial decision for that of the Tax Commission
or board of supervisors on any question.-
Review under Kentucky Revised Statutes section 138.120. In
the extraordinary session of the General Assembly in 1949, the
ad valorem tax system was completely revised pursuant to a plan
proposed by the Department of Revenue. This revision covered
Chapters 132 and 183 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.' The
result of the revision was to change radically the scope of review
by the circuit court. Kentucky Revised Statutes section 183.120,
as revised, provides for a de novo determination by the Tax Com-
mission when reviewing an assessment of the board of super-
visors. The parties may then appeal (only after first going before
the Tax Commission)7 to the "circuit court of the county where
the property is located and thence to the Court of Appeals, as
provided by law." (Italics supplied by writer.) It will be noted
that there is no statutory definition of scope of judicial review as
there was prior to 1949. The only phrase which could define the
scope of review by the circuit court is, "as provided by law." But,
does this phrase refer to appeal to the circuit court or appeal to
the Court of Appeals? From the position of this clause it is
arguable that the reference is only to the statutes governing
appeals to the Court of Appeals. It is submitted that the phrase
refers also to the circuit court. The statute, as originally reported
to the General Assembly, provided for appeal to the circuit court
exclusively "as provided by law," without express provision for
'CARROLL'S Ky. CoDE see. 726.
'Board of Sup'rs, City of Somerset v. Pinnel, 292 Ky. 364, 166 S.W. 2d 882(1942); McCracken Fiscal Court v. McFadden, 275 Ky. 819, 122 S.W. 2d 76
1938); Carr's Fork Coal Co. v. Perry County Board of Sup'rs, 263 Ky. 642, 93
S.W. 2d 359 (1936).
'See "Report of Statute Revision Commission to the General Assembly of
Kentucky in Extraordinary Session" (1949) which covers the proposed ad valorem
tax system legislation.
'On the theory of exhaustion on administrative remedies. See Louisville and
Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission v. Stoker, 259 S.W. 2d 443
(Ky. 195-3); Breathitt County Board of Sup'rs v. Ware Cannel Coal Co. 297 Ky.
117, 179 S.W. 2d 225 (1944).
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further appeal to the Court of Appeals.8 The statute as finally
passed by the General Assembly did allow for further appeal to
the highest court. It is a logical assumption from the preceding,
therefore, that the phrase, "as provided by law," was intended to
refer to the circuit court, and this is the opinion of the legal staff
of the Department of Revenue.
Assuming the application of the clause to the circuit court,
to what 'law" which has been "provided" does the statute refer?
There are several reasons which lead to the belief that the 'law"
referred to is Kentucky Revised Statutes section 131.120, which
provides for appeals generally from the Tax Commission. First,
that has been the administrative construction of the phrase for
five years. The Department of Revenue has always interpreted
the phrase as referring to section 131.120, and, according to the
department, this view has never been questioned. 10 Second, sec-
tion 131.120 is the key statute on appeals from the Tax Commis-
sion, being referred to expressly in three statutes as the authority
under which appeals are taken from the Tax Commission, and by
implication in section 133.120 by the revisor's cross-reference note
at the end of the statute." Third, section 131.120 is the only
statute which defines scope of review on appeal from the Tax
Commission. Thus, section 183.120 either refers to this "law" or
to no law. Fourth, section 133.120, after its revision in 1944,
provided for appeal from the circuit court to the Court of Appeals
in the manner provided by the Civil Code. When the appellant,
in the alternative according to his option, had appealed to the Tax
Commission, he was allowed appeal to the Franklin circuit court
"as provided by law." Thus, historically under the statute, the
phrase has referred to appeals taken to the circuit court. Section
181.120 expressly purports to define scope of review as to appeals
to the Franklin circuit court, but notwithstanding the rule of
enumeratio uni us, it would seem reasonable to interpret the
statute to include appeals under section 133.120 to any circuit
court since it is the only statute defining scope of review by cir-
'Report of Statute Revision Commission, supra note 6, at H.B. 8, see. 7 and
S.B. 8, sec. 7.
'Personal conversation with legal staff of the Department of Revenue, No-
vember 5, 1954.
1o Ibid.
' Ky. REv. STAT. sees. 181.160, 188.852, and 188.355 refer to sec. 181.120 for
appeal.
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cult courts on appeal from the Tax Commission.12 This view is
strengthened by the fact that section 131.125 provides that all
appeals from the Tax Commission shall be taken "subject to the
conditions as provided in . . . KRS 131.120." Even though sec-
tion 138.120 provides a different court to review the Tax Com-
mission's decisions, there is no reason why review under section
133.120 should not be subject to the conditions of section 131.120
as to scope of review when this is the only statute that provides
for any fairly definite scope of review.
Review Under Kentucky Revised Statutes section 131.120. If
the above analysis is correct in its argument and conclusions, the
problem of defining the scope of review of the circuit court has
now limited itself to a determination of the scope of review under
section 131.120. Once scope of review is defined under this sec-
tion, it is also defined under section 133.120.
The parts of section 131.120 applicable to a definition of scope
of review provide that the taxpayer may appeal from the order
of the Tax Commission, "on any question of law, including
adequacy of evidence." When the court hears the appeal, it shall
be "heard by the court on the record, except that either party may
introduce evidence of fraud." This statute would seem to have
been based on concepts which originated during the period in
American jurisprudence when courts based their review of ad-
ministrative decisions on an analytical distinction between ques-
tions of law and questions of fact. Today in the United States
generally, and particularly in federal courts, this distinction has
been rejected as an unrealistic approach to the problem of scope
of review.13 The primary problem of scope of review now is the
extent to which the courts do and should review the application
of legal concepts to undisputed or established facts. 4 However,
the statute under consideration is framed in the language of law
and fact, and it must be discussed in that context.
I The rule of enumeratio unius est exclusio alterius relating to statutory con-
struction is an argument against the conclusion of this writer, i.e., since the Frank-
lin County circuit court is specifically named, the statute, by implication, couldn't
apply to other circuit courts. However, if the Franklin circuit court is to hear
an appeal from an original assessment made by the Tax Commission solely on the
record,afortiori, the appeal should be heard on the record on an appeal under
KY. REv. STAT. sec. 133.120 which is a review of two prior reviews.
"'DAviS, ADMINSThATIVE LAW 874 (1951); CoorF-, Arnm-ssAnvE
AGENCmS iN T=E Couts 339 (1951).
,DAVIs, op. cit. supra note 13, at 868.
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By implication the circuit court is not allowed to review any
question of fact. Since the statute specifically directs the court to
review questions of law, it is a reasonable assumption, that the
review is limited to questions of law only. But in order to define
questions of law, questions of fact must also be considered. There
have been no cases decided under this statute which make that
distinction. An attempt will be made to ascertain the probable
scope of review by examining analogous appeal statutes, and by
looking at the nature of the assessment of taxes.
Decisions Affecting Scope of Review. In Brown v. Wayne
County Board of Sup'rs,15 the taxpayer appealed under section
138.120 from a judgment of the circuit court asking for a lowering
of the tax assessed by the board of supervisors. The court said
that, even though the evidence was brief and not altogether satis-
factory, as to mere overassessment, "Only a question of fact was
presented, and we are unable to say from the evidence in the
record that the learned circuit judge did not properly fix the
valuation . .."16 The court held that overassessment presented
a question of fact on which they would not substitute their judg-
ment. The reasons for this lack of judicial review are set forth in
Grant County Board of Sup'rs v. Williams,17 where it was said:
The judge of the lower court saw and heard the witnesses,
perhaps was acquainted with them, and was in a better
position to determine their credibility and the value of their
testimony than are we. In a case of this character [over-
evaluation] his judgment should not be reversed, unless it
is clearly against the weight of evidence.18
Of course, these cases were heard on appeal from a de novo de-
termination by the circuit court, but the reasoning of the Court
of Appeals applies with equal weight to the Tax Commission. The
circuit court, under section 181.120, is expressly directed by
statute to hear an appeal on the record. The evidence will have
been heard and taken by the Tax Commission, a body of experts
in the field of taxation, dealing with technical concepts beyond
the knowledge of one untrained in the field.
- 204 Ky. 550, 264 S.W. 1073 (1924).
Is Id. at 551, 264 S.W. at 1074.
17204 Ky. 722, 265 S.W. 286 (1924).
Is Id. at 722, 265 S.W. at 287.
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Valuation, however, is not completely precluded from judicial
review. Overvaluation which is "tantamount to intentional" will
authorize relief.' Intentional overvaluation will make the ques-
tion one of law rather than fact, on grounds of unconstitutional
discrimination. This intentional overvaluation must be "so con-
tinuous, persistent, and uniform from time to time as to show that
there was some scheme ... among those whose duty it was to
assess property... ."20
In addition, the statute itself makes "adequacy of evidence"
a proper subject of review. Ordinarily the circuit court should
not readily disturb the Tax Commission's findings of fact. Where
statutes require the reviewing circuit court to hear the appeal
on the record, as in section 131.120, it has been held that if find-
ings of the administrative body are supported by substantial
evidence, the board's findings of fact are conclusive, although
reasonable persons may differ with the finding upon the evidence
before the board.2' Substantial evidence has been defined as that
which is competent or probative to support a particular result.22
Though mere overvaluation and findings of fact supported by
evidence should not come within the review of the circuit court,
there are other considerations that are reviewable. The courts
often consider reviewable the question of whether the right rule
of law has been applied by the administrative body. The Ken-
tucky Court has said that supremacy of law demands that there
shall be an opportunity to have some court decide whether er-
roneous rules of law have been applied by the administrative
body. 3 Supremacy of law also demands that the court should
decide whether the proceedings in which the facts have been
adjudicated were conducted lawfully.24
The circuit court should also review questions of statutory
interpretation and application. The reasons for the reviewability
of a statutory interpretation have never been stated by the Court
" Siler v. Board of Sup'rs of Whitley County, 221 Ky. 100, 298 S.W. 189
(1927).
Id. at 103, 298 S.W. at 191.
'McNely v. Gladdis, 309 Ky. 698, 218 S.W. 2d 1 (1949); see Middlecamp
v. Willis, 267 S.W. 2d 924 (Ky. 1953).
2Justice v. Call Bros. Hdw. Co., 312 Ky. 761, 229 S.W. 2d 746 (1950).
" Daugherty v. Kentucky Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 249 Ky. 262,
130 S.W. 2d 756 (1939).
1, id.
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in a case relating to taxation. However, the courts do and should
review these questions because the statutes under which adminis-
trative authorities act are policies of the General Assembly, and
since judicial review is an additional assurance that these policies
will be executed, the questions of statutory interpretation are
always ultimately determinable by the courts.2 5
Since, in Kentucky, the assessment of property for taxation is
supervised rather specifically by the Constitution, the constitu-
tional questions are numerous.26 The Court has always considered
reviewable any question concerning the constitutionality of an
assessment, such as sufficiency of notice of an increase in assess-
ment,27 whether there has been an unconstitutional discrimina-
tion against property,2 or whether there is a constitutional tax-
able situs. 29 The Court has said that this right to decide on con-
stitutional questions is independent of any statutory provisions
allowing for such review.30
In summary, the circuit courts, when reviewing the Tax Com-
mission's decisions, should review narrowly. The statute under
which review is prosecuted is, when properly interpreted, framed
narrowly. The decisions of the Court of Appeals under the pre-
1949 section 183.120 show a narrow scope of review of de novo
decisions made by circuit courts. These decisions, certainly not
binding authority, should nevertheless be persuasive as showing
the attitude of the highest court toward judicial review in taxa-
tion cases. In addition, there are other considerations which point
toward a narrow review by the courts.
General Considerations. Taxation itself, as distinguished from
other fields of governmental operation and administrative law,
stands in a unique position. Without taxation, the very existence
United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers' Corp., 315 U.S. 475 (1942).
Ky. CONSTITTON secs. 171, 172, and 174.
Burnside Supply Co. v. Burnside Grade School, 260 Ky. 482, 86 S.W. 2d
160 (1935); McFarland v. Georgetown National Bank, 208 Ky. 7, 270 S.W. 995
(1925).(9Eminence Distillery Co. v. Henry County Board of Sup'rs, 178 Ky. 811,
200 S.W. 347 (1918) Cf. Siler v. Board of Sup'rs of Whitley County, supra note
19; Thomas v. Board of Suprs of Jackson County, 119 S.W. 209 (Ky. 1909).
Commonwealth v. Union Pac. Br. Co., 214 Ky. 339, 283 S.W. 119 (1926).
' Commonwealth et al. v. Big Sandy Co., 155 Ky. 412, 159 S.W. 956 (1913);
even where the statute directs that the assessment "shall be final" with no appeal
to the courts, the assessment is open to collateral attack on constitutional grounds,
see Kentucky Heating Co. v. City of Louisville, 174 Ky. 142, 192 S.W. 4 (1917)
which synthesizes the law on this subject.
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of government is questionable. Dickinson says that the function
of taxation is essential to the "good order ... and welfare of so-
ciety."31 The process of assessment is highly technical, and de-
pends, to a great extent, upon opinions made with a background
of technical knowledge. Since the process is technical, and stands
as it does in relation to government, ... "the role of the courts
... should be that of umpire-not that of participant."32 Assess-
ment is essentially administrative, rather than judicial, and there-
fore, .... "as all valuation of property is more or less a matter of
opinion, we see no reason why the opinion of the court.., should
be better or should be substituted for that of the board, whose
opinion the law has declared to be the one to govern the matter."
33
The assessment of property for taxation and the review of
such an assessment by the Tax Commission have been classified
as a discretionary function. In City of Louisville v. Martin34 the
city sued to force the Commissioner of Revenue to reassess
whiskey. The Court held that a mandamus would not lie to
review the decision to secure reassessment when the officer acted
in good faith. The Court spoke of the discretionary powers of the
Tax Commission by way of dictum, saying:
The Tax Commission in making such assessment is invested
with a broad discretion and a mere error in judgment as to
the fair cash value ... would not authorize the court to in-
terfere and substitute its judgment for the judgment of the
commission.35
Not relating to the Tax Commission, but to the public welfare
commission, the Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith v.
Frost36 has said that a judgment based upon discretion would not
be disturbed unless such discretion is abused, unreasonably exer-
cised, or otherwise unlawful. The Court said:
There are many factors affecting the scope of judicial review
of administrative action. Neither its extent nor limitation
can be closely defined. In the absence of statutory authority
DIcINsoN, ADm TnISaA=ThE JUSTICE AND SUPRENIACY OF LAW, 268 (1927).
Throckmorton, Judicial Review of Tax Assessments in Iowa, 26 IowA L. REv.
728, 769 (1941).
"State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575, 610 (1875).
284 Ky. 490, 144 S.W. 2d 1034 (1940).
" Id. at 1037.
295 Ky. 137, 146, 172 S.W. 2d 905, 909 (1943).
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in a particular case, it may be said that the courts will not,
under the pretext of finding a remedy for one believed to be
wronged, assume to exercise a discretion which the people,
acting through their Legislature, have lodged in administra-
tive officers and agencies.37
The court should feel no differently about the Tax Commission.
The quasi-judicial nature of certain administrative bodies has
always carried with it a presumption of the correctness and fair-
ness of their decisions.38 The rule should be no different when
applied to the Tax Commission, especially when it is considered
that in addition to being a discretionary, quasi-judicial body, the
subject matter with which the Commision deals is taxation.
Aside from the legal considerations, there are also practical
considerations affecting the scope of review of the Tax Com-
mission's decisions. By statute, the only prerequisite to appeal
by a taxpayer is that he be "aggrieved." According to the legal
staff of the Department of Revenue, there are now pending
before them 1500 cases. Most of these are simple collection cases
which will be settled by default judgment, but some 500 of these
are cases to be heard on appeal by the Tax Connission.39 Unless
the scope or review of these decisions is narrow, both the circuit
courts and the Court of Appeals will be overburdened.
Another practical, as well as legal, consideration is that the
proceedings before the Tax Commission are conducted with most
of the procedural safeguards of the courts. Any person interested
in any proceedings before the Tax Commission may appear and
give evidence.40 The rules of evidence are the same as in civil pro-
ceedings in any court of Kentucky, except that the rules may be
relaxed if. . . "the ends of justice will be better served .... ,4
Upon application, hearings may be re-opened for the introduction
of additional evidence.4 Decisions made under rules of this char-
acter call for no broad review by the courts out of fear of ar-
bitrariness by the Tax Commission.
Ibid.
Louisville & Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission v. Ogden,
307 Ky. 362, 365, 210 S.W. 2d 771, 773 (1948).
Supra note 8.
"Rules of Practice and Procedure Before The Kentucky Tax Commission,
Rule 3.
"Id. at Rule 8-a.Id. at Rule 8-c.
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The same factors considered in relation to the circuit court
apply with equal force to review by the Court of Appeals.43
Logically, the highest court will not review any more broadly
than the circuit court. By the time an appeal reaches the Court
of Appeals an assessment will have been originally made by the
county tax commissioner, and reviewed by the board of super-
visors, the Tax Commission, and a circuit court. If the review by
the circuit court is narrow under the statutes being considered,
there is no legal or practical reason for a broader review by the
highest court.
Conclusion. In summary, it is concluded that when the
Court of Appeals does pass upon the question of scope of review
of the Tax Commision's decisions on appeals prosecuted under
Kentucky Revised Statutes sections 181.120 and 183.120, the court
will establish a narrow scope of review, and limit the review by
the courts to a consideration of the correctness of statutory
interpretations by the Commission, the constitutionality of the
particular assessment, and the lawfulness of the proceedings.
Precluded from judicial review should be questions of mere over-
valuation, if not intentional or discriminatory. Commission find-
ings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, should be
conclusive. This is thought to be a valid conclusion, after a
consideration of the nature of taxation, the discretionary and
quasi-judicial powers of the Commission, and a summary of the
practical reasons for making such a decision. However, a final
word of warning should be added, expresed so aptly by Cooper:
The factors determining the scope and extent of judicial re-
view ... are essentially temporal in nature, varying with the
attitude of the particular court ... the reputation of the par-
ticular (administrative) tribunal ...and other elements
which vary widely from case to case.44
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S 3An appeal to the Court of Appeals will only be prosecuted under Ky. REv.STAT. sec. 133.120, none being expressly allowed under Ky. REv. STAT. sec.
1:31.120. An appeal to the courts under Ky. Rrv. STAT. sec. 131.120 would have
to be taken other than under the statute and would lie in only certain instances.
See in this connection Kentucky Heating Co. v. City of Louisville, supra note 30.
"CooPEn, op. cit. supra note 13, at 330.
